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Field Observations of an Expeditionary Strike Group: A Prerequisite to 
Model-driven Experimentation of Adaptive C2 Processes 
 
Abstract:  
The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is a versatile military organization, designed to effectively handle 
missions as diverse as expeditionary warfare, air warfare, tactical ballistic missile defense, and maritime 
interdiction operations.  Different ESG organizations have allocated command in novel ways, each 
affecting organizational dynamics differently.  The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control 
(A2C2) program has been using model based-experimentation to investigate the congruence of 
organizational structure with mission requirements.  The ESG provides an opportunity to apply the 
principles developed in previous A2C2 research to this rapidly evolving operational organization.  ESG, 
Amphibious Squadron, and Marine Expeditionary Unit staffs were interviewed, and observations were 
made in the command center and during daily battle rhythm meetings.  This led to insight regarding 
questions of interest for the Navy, such as the allocation of Composite Warfare Command (CWC) roles, 
the inclusion of an ISR coordinator, and the division of tasks under both CWC and Joint Amphibious 
Doctrine – especially as these affect the Commander of the Amphibious Squadron (CPR).  This 
information will form a basis to increase the fidelity of the representations and processes used in models, 
to create realistic scenarios, and to develop experimental designs with which to examine relevant issues of 
organizational structure. 
Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) 
Over the past decade, the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research program, 
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), has focused on examining command structures for 
future Naval, Joint and Combined forces.  As the primary adversaries of the United States change from 
Cold War monoliths to smaller asymmetric threats, new C2 structures need to be explored which are 
ideally suited to meeting new challenges.  The charter of the A2C2 program is to help develop these 
organizational structures, structures that are adaptable in the face of new enemies and new missions.  
However, the A2C2 program is valuable not just for its mission, but for its methodology.  The driving 
force behind the A2C2 program is the concept of model-based experimentation.  Figure 1 depicts the 
process that begins with theoretical and operational concepts and moves in an iterative fashion through 
modeling and experimentation.  Early in the process, models are refined through consultation with subject 
matter experts and first-run simulations, which produce definitions of scenarios and organizations, as well 
as guidance for experimental design and data collection measures.  Organizational concepts are informed 
and refined, based on data collected, leading to additional cycles of modeling and experimentation.  
Critically, this model-test-model-experiment process leads to well-specified hypotheses and precisely 
defined measures.  The resulting operational concepts are brought back to decision makers, providing 
empirical evidence as they make choices about organizational change. 
However, for the A2C2 process of model-based experimentation to be worthwhile, the issues being 
investigated in the laboratory and in the simulation must reflect the major challenges faced in a changing 
military.  That is, A2C2 researchers must employ operationally anchored model-based experimentation, 
and the results of the empirical investigations must provide the decisionmakers with information they 
currently lack.  Previous efforts have accomplished this goal through extensive consultation with Naval 
personnel, and have led to several successes.  Early research involved working with the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XVIII to help define adaptive command structures for 
what will become Sea Power 21.  Next, the A2C2 team worked with Commander Carrier Group One 







structures in preparation for Global Wargame 1999 (Levchuk et al., 2000; Hess et al., 2000).  In 2001, 
A2C2 team members conducted a series of quantitative modeling and simulation analyses to support the 
SSG XXI Cognitive Concept Generation Team.  The goal was to align the Navy’s tactical C2 
organization and processes with the FORCEnet concept, the Navy’s implementation of network-centric 
warfare.  Results highlighted the superiority of FORCEnet structures over Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC) structures for future missions (Serfaty et al., 2002).  More recently, the A2C2 
program has been using the model-based experimentation paradigm to investigate the congruence of 
organizational structure with mission requirements, and the elements required for effective strategic and 














Figure 1. Basic Process Illustration of A2C2 Operationally Anchored Model-based Experimentation. 
The Expeditionary Strike Group 
Our current research utilizes the model-based experimental approach to assess organizational constructs 
and structures for the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  At its core, an ESG is a US Navy task force 
that is scalable, adaptable, and capable of planning and executing a wide range of missions.  It combines 
the amphibious capabilities of a traditional Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(Special Operations Capable) (ARG/MEU[SOC]) with the combatant firepower of Navy cruisers, 
destroyers, and frigates (Hutchins et al., 2005).  Amphibious landing ships move troops, vehicles, and 
supplies wherever they are needed and provide great flexibility to commanders in planning operations.  
However, amphibious ships are not designed for fighting hostile naval forces, especially highly 
maneuverable patrol craft found in coastal environments.  Moreover, traditional ARG/MEU(SOC) 
deployments had no capability to provide naval surface fire support (NSFS) for Marines ashore or to 
strike targets at sea.  In order to counter littoral threats, the Navy has transformed ARGs into ESGs by 
assigning dedicated combatant ships – cruisers, destroyers, and frigates – to protect the amphibious ships 
(ESG OPS 2005).  ESGs are now able to provide NSFS and Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes 
in support of Marines ashore.  This increased combat capability includes a variety of assets to conduct 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Strike and Naval Fire Support, Air Warfare, 
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)/Surface Warfare, Maritime Interdiction Operations, and Tactical Ballistic 
Missile Defense.  
In addition to being a flexible organization, the ESG is also an experimental organization, with two 
different command configurations depending on whether the ESG originates from the West or East Coast.  







Amphibious Doctrines, the internal C2 organization of the ESG has not yet been standardized.  When the 
first ESG deployed in 2003, the Commander (CESG) viewed the ESG as the maritime component for the 
Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).  The West Coast model of the ESG has a flag or general officer 
(FO/GO) led staff, which provides the combatant commander with: (1) a subordinate staff capable of 
planning at the operational level; (2) the capability to task organize, which included taking command of 
inorganic forces as required; and (3) a single source commander capable of providing maritime and land 
force (US Fleet Forces Command, 2002).  A second ESG was deployed in 2004 from the East Coast.  The 
two deployments were similar in terms of ship and aircraft composition, but they were different in ESG 
organizational structures and command relationships  In particular, the East Coast model ESG did not 
have a FO/GO Commander (Deal et al., 2004; Hutchins et al., 2005).. The group composition of both 
pilot deployments increased the group’s offensive and defensive capabilities.  The differences in 
command structure and responsibility affect organizational dynamics, however.  The evolving 
organizational structure, integration of Joint resources, part-time inclusion of coalition assets, and 
competing demands for mission prioritization make the ESG an ideal subject of study for the A2C2 
program. 
A unique and key advantage of the ESG is structural adaptability.  This inherent characteristic permits 
the ESG to support a wide range of missions (from amphibious assault to disaster relief).  The unique 
command structure that integrates the Navy and Marine Corps forces is key to this adaptability.  An 
aspect of this adaptable structure entails activating alternate warfare commanders, who operate in 
supported/supporting roles depending on the mission, in order to distribute workload.  Lateral 
collaboration is employed as an enabler of structural adaptability with a reliance on non-traditional 
communication and coordination.  
Table 1. Integrated Mission Essential Tasks Conducted by an Expeditionary Strike Group. 
Both USN and USMC 
 Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and  
 Reconnaissance 
 Conduct Amphibious Assault 
 Conduct Information Operations/ Warfare  Conduct Amphibious Withdrawal 
 Tactical Deception Operations  Conduct Amphibious Demonstration 
 Provide Operational Fires (Joint/ Coalition)  Conduct NEO 
 Provide Anti-Terrorism/ Force Protection  Conduct Humanitarian/ Disaster Assist 
 Conduct Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Peace Operations 
 Conduct MIO/ EMIO Operations  Conduct Deliberate Planning 
 Conduct ESG Force Defense  
 (AD/USW/SUW/DAF) 
 Provide Contingency Support Packages (TRAP,  
 CASEVAC, QRF, MASS, CASUALTY)  
 Conduct VBSS (compliant/ non-compliant)  USMC Specific 
  
 Conduct Sustainment Operations  Conduct Amphibious Raid 
 Provide Command, Control, Communications  
 and Computers 
 Conduct Direct Action Operations  
 (Precision Raid or VBSS) 
 Conduct Initial Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Airfield/ Port Seizure 
 
USN Specific   
 Conduct Security Operations 
 Provide Theatre Missile Defense Warning  Conduct Limited Expeditionary Airfield Op’s 
 Provide Sea Lines of Communications Protection  Employ Non-Lethal Weapons 
 Provide Sanctions Enforcement  Conduct Enhanced Urban Operations 
 Deploy/ Conduct Operational Maneuver  
The result of this unique combination of assets and structural adaptability is a highly mobile group of 
platforms with a lean command and authority structure.  Their ability to provide a rapid response is 







ESGs are also designed to be self-sustaining, as well as capable of autonomous action due to the diverse 
set of capabilities they provide.  ESGs provide Combatant Commanders with more flexible, robust, and 
distributed offensive combat capability and enhance Naval expeditionary force survivability.  Core 
capabilities provided by ESGs include: (1) Power projection, (2) Maritime superiority for air, surface and 
subsurface, (3) Maritime special operations, (4) Amphibious operations, (5) Military operations other than 
war, (6) Enabling operations, (7) Supporting operations, and (8) serving as a Joint Task Force enabler. 
Table 1 presents a list of the integrated essential tasks that are conducted by an ESG.  
ESG: Organizational Issues 
As the ESG is a relatively new Navy concept, there are several issues regarding organizational structure 
that merit investigation.  The combination of the ARG/MEU(SOC) with the Navy cruisers, destroyers, 
and frigates historically assigned to Carrier Battle Groups is not simply a novel aggregation of resources; 
the underlying C2 philosophy must be reconsidered in light of new capabilities.  The list of missions 
described in Table 1 require not just increased training, but a deliberate allocation of command 
responsibility over a finite number of commanders.  The diverse leadership and staff structures chosen by 
East and West Coast models impact the relationships among major sub-commands, specifically the MEU 
and the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON). 
An adaptive C2 architecture for an ESG –referring to both structure and process – should be able to work 
smoothly – for both planning and operations – as an unitary entity, or as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), 
working directly for the Joint Force Commander (e.g., operating as a theater reserve or operating as a 
small JTF).  This requires a large degree of flexibility, and a C2 apparatus that can seamlessly 
metamorphose on response to the mission and tasking.  Given A2C2’s mission and methods, and given 
the tasks envisioned for the ESG, the pairing is ideal.  
The challenge, then, is to achieve the operational anchoring required for fruitful model-based 
experimentation.  This requires information of two different sorts: 
A. High level challenges to be investigated, their origins, and their implications.  This ensures that 
the hypotheses addressed in the laboratory will have resonance in the planning rooms and 
operations centers. 
B. Low level information about the organization.  This could include specifications of resources, 
current or candidate organizational structures, and patterns of information flow.  These details are 
essential for modeling the correct processes and for adding realism to experimentation. 
Over the past year, these two types of information regarding the ESG have been gathered in preparation 
for our planned modeling and experimental efforts.  The methods for collecting this information included 
interviews with high level members of an ESG staff, extensive review of doctrine and procedures, 
monitoring of mission progress via closed and open sources, and first-person observation of C2 processes 
during deployment.  The ultimate goal of this process is to inform the model-based experimental process 
and provide the most relevant information to the individuals responsible for organizational structure.  
Within the ESG, multiple Navy and Marine Corps sub-organizations must coordinate their actions to meet 
varied mission objectives.  Over the past several ESG deployments, a number of interesting 
organizational challenges were noted, and the A2C2 team was asked to investigate.  A three-phased 
research program focusing on organizational analysis and design was put forward.  This encompassed: 
o Assessment: Qualitative analysis and assessment of the current ESG structure along with a 
diagnosis of problematic areas and suggestions for potential organizational remedies. 
o Comparison: Comparative modeling of current ESG structure versus selected alternative 







o Optimization: Optimization-based design and simulation of alternative C2 architectures. 
Quantitative assessment of performance pay-offs. 
The assessment portion of the research program is designed to provide the ESG with immediate 
actionable guidance based on past experience, and provide the A2C2 project team with the information 
required for effective operationally anchored model-based experimentation.  To these ends, a list of 
(observed or assumed) potential areas of interest, along with associated recommendations, was developed.  
These were drawn from collected A2C2 experiences, attendance at a number of training exercises, 
interviews with ESG personnel, and a review of the literature pertaining to ESGs, including lessons-
learned from previous deployments.  Seven topics were chosen for further study based on their 
importance to mission success; and are described below. 
Topic 1: Restructuring the Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) cell – Part A: Amphibious Warfare 
The PHIBRON cell in a recent West Coast model ESG was responsible for both amphibious operations 
(such as embarkation, transit, and assault under combat conditions) and Sea Combat Command (SCC) 
operations (such as Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare, Maritime Interdiction Operations [MIO], and 
Maritime Security Operations [MSO]).  During high operational tempo conditions, it is possible for the 
limited PHIBRON staff to become overloaded by the number of concurrent missions.  This could be 
problematic when conducting amphibious operations in parallel with ongoing SCC/MIO/MSO duties.  
This potential for overload is exacerbated by the fact that the CPR has a small, junior staff who is 
experienced in amphibious operations, but less so in MIO/MSO/SCC duties.  Additionally, at issue was 
how to retain CPR command focus on the (changing) primary current mission area.  Finally, it was noted 
that this node is operating under two different doctrines: Joint Amphibious Doctrine and Composite 
Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrines. 
Our recommendations based on a review of available documentation, limited interviews with senior staff, 
as well as previous experience with organizational design in general and the A2C2 program in particular 
included: 
• Have the Commander of the PHIBRON (CPR) retain the title of AWC (Amphibious Warfare 
Commander) to handle amphibious operations under existing amphibious supported-supporting (S-S) 
doctrine. 
• Augment the CPR staff as needed during amphibious operations 
• Split off remaining areas (MIO/MSO/SCC) under subordinate, co-equal or alternate commander(s) to 
operate under CWC doctrine.  [Note: It is essential for alternate commanders to have continual 
training/practice in their roles.] 
• Conduct formal training intervention on teamwork behaviors that mitigate overload. 
Topic 2: Restructuring the PHIBRON cell – Part B: Maritime Operations
The high number of potential contacts (and critical contacts of interest) in a busy maritime region could 
lead to high workload in the PHIBRON, especially when conducting MIO/MSO.  Moreover, the nature of 
MIO differs significantly from other maritime duties, requiring different staff expertise and information 
utilization.  MIO utilizes different information (e.g., maritime and shipping databases, coordination with 
ships’ country of origin, following international procedures, etc.), and uses assets unique to visit, board, 
search and seizure (VBSS) operations. 
Our recommendations included: 
• Establish a self-contained MIO commander and cell operating under a CWC-like doctrine. The MIOC 
could be either subordinate to, or co-equal with, the SCC. 
• Staff this cell with people having expertise pertinent to MIO, with very tight coordination with the 







• We noted that MIO and MSO may be combinable, as both use very similar maritime picture.  This 
may allow giving the remaining sea defense (of own forces) role to an alternate commander (e.g., CG, 
LHA) to further off-load CPR and staff especially when under high MIO tasking. 
Topic 3: ISR Coordinator or Commander
The importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), especially as part of the War on 
Terror, was stressed repeatedly in training.  Yet the ESG has a limited access to ISR-dedicated assets 
which could lead to possible “stovepiping” of ISR assets and requests by separate air/sea/ground areas, 
and inefficient use of scarce (low number, high-demand) assets to cover a large area.  It is essential to 
make effective use of the inherent ISR capabilities of all assets (including ESG, theater, and national 
level) and to maximize multi-capable ISR platforms (e.g., UAV, E2C, P3) including external ISR support 
and reachback. 
Our recommendations included: 
• Establish the position/role of ISR commander or coordinator (ISR-C) to prioritize asset utilization for 
ISR. 
• This node should have tasking authority of ISR-dedicated assets (e.g., UAV), and should coordinate 
tasking of other assets for ISR purposes. 
• ISR-C must be part of the ESG planning cells especially current operations. 
Topic 4: Hybrid Supporting-Supported Structure and Internal Control 
Supported-supporting (S-S) relationships, according to Joint Doctrine, are a somewhat vague, but very 
flexible arrangement.  There may often be a spectrum of S-S relations: from preset to fully dynamic or 
contingent.  In a dynamic context, conflicts are possible when supporting multiple concurrent missions, 
especially if that commander is the supported commander for another mission.  It is also noted that a 
supported commander needs sufficient staff to plan and guide the mission.  However, within an ESG, it is 
not clear when S-S relationships that are determined on a mission-by-mission or contextual basis break 
down (e.g., under high workload, dispersed forces, heterogeneous tasking, etc.).  One objective of the 
A2C2 research is to identify potential challenges in implementing S-S relationships. 
Our recommendations included: 
• The ESG should be prepared to augment the planning capability/staff of a supported commander. 
• Senior staff in current operations (COPS) must be ready to resolve conflicts that may arise when a 
commander is supporting multiple concurrent missions, or between a commander’s primary warfare 
role and supporting roles.  In addition, the S-S commanders must alert N3/N5 early enough on 
potential conflicts. 
• The assignment of who is supported and who is supporting must consider other factors (e.g. current 
loading) in addition to expertise and C2 capability. 
Issue 5: Expeditionary Action Groups “Unplugged” and Distributed Command and Control
An Expeditionary Action Group (EAG) – typically one ARG ship, one surface combatant ship, and some 
aircraft that are deployed to some location outside the immediate battlespace – is no longer under some or 
all of the protective umbrellas (air, sea, etc.) of the ESG.  Thus, dispatching an EAG can leave significant 
holes in the remaining/residual ESG forces. 
Our recommendations included: 
• Augment the EAG staff as required to enable operation as a self-contained entity (multi-area defense 







• Have a Liaison Office (LNO) on the ESG Flagship to maintain lines of communication (C2) and 
overview between the ESG and the EAG. 
• Consider consolidating CWC roles among remaining ESG forces and activating alternate warfare 
commanders: e.g., merge sea and air defense into a single ESG defense node. (See related comments 
under the CPR topic). 
Issue 6: Command and Control of “Revolving Door” Assets
Based on prior ESG experiences, it was expected that assets would be attached to and detached from 
(TACON) the ESG on a frequent (as needed) basis.  Many of these assets are Coalition ships, some are 
from different services/groups (Coast Guard, Carrier Strike Group, shore-based, etc.) and follow their 
individual doctrines/processes, and dual chain of command.  Expertise in effective use of these assets may 
not be resident in the ESG, and different information access may constrain tasking options.  Long-range 
planning becomes challenging if assets are revolving in and out of the ESG. 
Our recommendations included: 
• Pass tactical control (TACON) of assets down to the most relevant warfare commander (or ship 
commanding officer) to avoid the need for the SCC to manage a large number of assets (typically 
ships). 
• Use S-S relationships to adjust the TACON assignments, on a mission-by-mission basis. 
• Use liaison officers (LNOs) as necessary for attached forces. 
• When assets that are playing key roles are detached, consider consolidating CWC roles among 
remaining ESG forces and activating alternate warfare commanders. 
Issue 7: Direct Tasking of MEU Assets (particularly the Air Combat Element) 
A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), such as is found in an ESG, is the smallest type of Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  Given the utility of assets controlled by the MEU, divergent priorities and 
objectives on the use of MAGTF assets among Warfare Commanders, MAGTF-CO, and ESG staff, 
conflicts were deemed likely unless procedures were established.  From the Marines’ perspective it was 
essential that the ESG task MAGTF assets without violating the integrity of the MAGTF, while also 
maintaining readiness of these assets to support impending MEU operations.  It was noted that there may 
be doctrinal and command relationship issues involved here between “big” Navy and Marines.   
Our recommendations included: 
• Tasking MAGTF assets as needed to support S-S relationships with the MAGTF commander 
whenever possible, and ensure that appropriate MAGTF staff are involved in the planning process. 
• Encourage a joint Marine Corp-Navy study to examine best way to task/employ all ESG assets to 
accomplish ESG missions. 
Other Issues  
In addition to these major issues, several additional issues were noted. 
• Control of assets – the management and allocation of limited assets over many possible missions 
• Synchronizing multiple planning cycles and commander’s intent – noting that the Navy uses a 
defined planning cycle whereas the Marines utilize a 6-hour Rapid Response Planning Process 
(R2P2).  
These issues and associated recommendations described above were presented to the Commander of the 
ESG, and senior members of his staff for their comments and for prioritizing the subsequent A2C2 







1. Restructuring the PHIBRON (CPR) Cell. This choice of this topic, which combined our 
issues 1 and 2, underscores the experimental aspect of the combined Amphibious/SCC 
responsibilities allocated to the PHIBRON in the ESG. 
2. Establishment of an ISR Commander/Coordinator. If the ESG is to have a level of 
autonomy in the global war on terror, the intelligence gathering must be well synchronized.  
This is especially difficult as the intelligence sources are collected by many different 
organizations within the ESG, using dispersed systems and sensors.  
3. Hybrid Supporting-Supported Structures.  When the West Coast ARG/MEUs were 
augmented with additional capabilities and a FO/GO led staff to become ESGs, the change 
was more than a simple addition of resources.  The way in which the major sub-commands 
(i.e., PHIBRON and MEU[SOC]) interact may have changed as well.  How do Supported-
Supporting relationships manifest themselves in this new organization? 
With these three topics as guidelines, the A2C2 team went forward in its efforts, and arrangements were 
made for several researchers to visit the ESG during its deployment. 
Interview and Observation  
The recommendations outlined above were based on a review of available documentation, limited 
interviews with senior staff, as well as previous experience with organizational design in general and the 
A2C2 program in particular.  However, additional information was required in order to ensure that 
suggestions for change matched the true operational needs.  Furthermore, as we plan to explore the 
challenges of the ESG using A2C2’s model-based experimentation paradigm, more detailed information 
detail is required.  With these three topics as guidelines, three members of the A2C2 team visited the 
flagship of an ESG during its deployment, just prior to sailing into theater. While the A2C2 researchers 
were aboard, ESG participated in a large, joint-coalition land/sea exercise. The embarked team 
interviewed both senior and junior staff members of the ESG, PHIBRON, and MEU(SOC), although 
MEU interviews were limited since the majority of the MEU was operating ashore (see Table 2), 
observed senior level briefings, reviewed information sources, and monitored the Joint 
Operations Center (JOC).  
Table 2. Staff Members Interviewed. 
ESG PHIBRON 
Commander, ESG Commodore 
Deputy Commander Future Operations 
N2: Intelligence Current Operations 
N3: Operations Intelligence 
N5: Future Operations MEU (SOC) 
N6: C4I Executive Officer 
Other staff officers… Communications, Planning, Watch 
Officers… 
In order to learn as much as possible while underway, the team needed to have guidelines as to what 
information to collect.  However, the methods used needed to be flexible to take advantage of the 
emergent nature of a real world military environment.  This was accomplished by having all members of 
the A2C2 team create a list of queries prior to the trip.  Each item was created to assist in refinement of 
the organizational areas of interest through experimentation.  That is, the information to be obtained 







While conducting the interviews and observing, the researchers ensured that the queries previously 
generated were addressed.  However, very early on it became clear that previously unidentified issues 
were important as well.  When these issues presented themselves, the researchers departed from the query 
list to investigate.  
A secondary method of data collection was direct observation of operations.  Members of the A2C2 team 
monitored the Joint Operations Center (JOC) where the Flag Watch Officer and the Assistant Flag Watch 
Officers coordinate activities with liaisons from the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON.  Observations were 
made in the JOC during each watch to ensure that the full range of operational tempos was observed.  The 
A2C2 team also observed meetings with the CESG and his staff, including future and current operations 
meetings (FOPS & COPS).  Interviews with staff members provided valuable insight about questions of 
interest for the CESG and for the Navy in general, and the observation of activities increased our 
understanding of information flow and decision making techniques in hybrid organizations such as the 
ESG.  
For both interviews and observations, particular emphasis was placed on the three topic areas identified 
by the CESG as being of high criticality.  Our observations in these areas are outlined below. 
Topic 1. PHIBRON Organizational Structure 
Members of the CPR staff recognized the value of utilizing the same staff to conduct both SCC and 
Expeditionary Warfare operations.  However, resources were limited and personnel experience was lower 
than the ideal.  For example, personnel resources officially allocated to the CPR were the same as had 
been allocated to them as part of an ARG/MEU.  However, an ESG has additional responsibilities and 
tasking.  Similarly, the experience level of the personnel, and their resulting rank, was lower than their 
equivalents in other ESG component organizations.  We note that the CPR was able to obtain a few key 
modifications to this allocation through personal interaction with the detailers, but these are not changes 
in the official allocation. 
One of the most interesting issues we wanted to address was the impact of multiple doctrines. 
Specifically, the PHIBRON must operate under two doctrines, composite warfare (CWC) for the SCC 
responsibilities, and joint amphibious for the amphibious operations.  In actual experience, the members 
of the PHIBRON reported that they experienced this more as a conflict of two different missions than a 
conflict between two doctrines.  The PHIBRON commander was acting as a single warfare commander 
executing two missions.  To reduce possible overload, in high operational tempos the PHIBRON staff 
reported naturally creating two sub-groups, one responsible for SCC and the other for amphibious 
operations.  The PHIBRON commander, in turn, could oversee both types of operations and ensure 
coordination.  While scenarios used during the ESG’s workups taxed both sides of the CPR cell 
simultaneously and placed an extreme load on the CPR, it was felt that this type of simultaneous load was 
unlikely given the planned deployment.  If it did occur, however, it could lead to the problems discussed 
above. 
With regard to Maritime operations (i.e., MIO, MSO), the ESG had not yet entered areas in which those 
activities would have been required.  Follow-up interviews will be conducted to investigate these 
operations. 
Topic 2: ISR Coordinator or Commander 
ISR is increasingly important in modern warfare, as our capabilities are tied to having accurate 
information.  The rationale behind a single ISR coordinator is that battlespace awareness can be 
maintained with a single information holder collecting and distributing information.  At the ESG level, 







ESG staff to serve as the ISR Coordinator.  His responsibility in this arena was to ensure that (1) the use 
of scarce resources was consistently in support of the commander’s intent, and (2) that the intelligence 
gathered was processed and integrated to be acted upon when necessary. 
The ESG was focusing on several geographically dispersed areas simultaneously, which challenged their 
capabilities.  However, by aligning the use of all the ESG intelligence assets with the commander’s intent, 
they were able to handle those areas simultaneously.  Both ESG current operations and future operations 
staffs were happy with the intelligence support they were receiving.  Because the initial data were 
gathered before the ESG entered it’s final operating environment, further data will be gathered upon a 
return visit to assess the ISR coordination topic.  Of particular interest is the effectiveness of using the 
ISR capability of assets that have a different primary purpose; thus expanding the overall ISR capabilities 
of the ESG. 
Topic 3: Hybrid Supporting-Supported Structure and Internal Control 
The nature of S-S relationships in the ESG is of great interest to the A2C2 project.  Various mission 
contingencies require the coordination of resources and capabilities by different commanders.  It is not 
difficult to imagine conditions in which two commanders are supporting each other simultaneously on 
two separate efforts.  The mechanism to enable this support was unclear before we embarked. 
Conceptually, the S-S arrangement in the ESG is based on the commander’s intent.  When a situation 
arises that requires support, the CESG’s priorities guide how the commands relate to each other.  Support 
is determined on a capabilities level rather than the asset level whenever possible.  That is, the PHIBRON 
may request transportation from the MEU, but would not ask for a particular vehicle.  We imagine that 
this may lead to some tension when resources that are the most efficient for a certain task are not offered.  
Following our visit, we are unsure of how critical an issue this is.  The current S-S relationships seem to 
have worked well up through our visit, but complex situations where S-S relationships might be taxed had 
not been experienced yet.  The current scheme works fine when there are only a few situations in which it 
occurs.  However, if the ESG is envisioned to engage in activities in which there are multiple, reciprocal, 
simultaneous S-S relationships among commands, greater specification may be required.  We will be 
exploring their experiences with S-S relationships during our follow-up visit in the coming months. 
Bringing the ESG into the Laboratory 
Information gathered during our time with the ESG will be used both to provide immediate ideas to the 
Navy regarding the organizational structure of the ESG and to inform our future modeling and 
experimentation.  The A2C2 program has a long tradition of identifying critical organizational issues in 
the military, abstracting fundamental properties of those issues, and investigating those issues using 
converging experimental and modeling approaches.  In the ESG, this tradition continues with additional 
operational relevance.  As the military moves towards more agile, self-contained organizations, it is 
imperative it does so with deep understanding of the organizational issues based on both deliberate expert 
analysis of unconstrained operational environments and controlled empirical investigation in the 
laboratory. 
Based on the high level information gained through review of relevant doctrine, interviews with ESG, 
PHIBRON, and MEU(SOC) staff, and direct observation of operations in an ESG, several activities will 
be undertaken: 
• Modeling and simulation of several ESG configurations, including the staff organization, 
subordinate commands, and major platforms.  The configuration of the CPR cell, the nature of 







• Validation and expansion of conclusions drawn from the modeling and simulation effort via 
laboratory experimentation.  These experiments, which use military participants, will address the 
issues of organization/mission congruence, the complexity of supported/supporting relationships, 
and the impact of divergent priorities on mission efficiency and performance. 
• Development or repurposing of scenarios that capture both 
o The missions and tasks for which the ESG has been designed, and 
o The types of missions and tasks that have been actually assigned to recent ESGs. 
The A2C2 team has the personnel and the facilities to conduct both agent-based modeling and simulation 
and team-in-the-loop experimentation, and has the knowledge and experience to recognize which 
combination of approaches would be most beneficial for a given problem.  With regard to the ESG, 
several efforts are envisioned (see Levchuck et al 2006 for more detail). 
ESG in Action: Two Case Studies 
The relevance of the modeling and experimental activities planned are contingent on their resemblance 
with the activities of existing ESGs.  The review of doctrine and the interaction with active ESG 
personnel has allowed us to provide the initial recommendations contained in this report.  However, much 
insight can be gained from surveying the missions undertaken by ESGs.  Over the past several years, 
ESGs have played key roles both in the war on terror and in disaster relief.  These case studies illustrate 
the breadth of missions that ESGs are capable of accomplishing, provide details for parameterization in 
simulation and modeling, and ground experimental scenarios in real-world events.  ESGs have been vital 
to several relief efforts, including the Indian Ocean tsunami and South-Asian earthquake.  Furthermore, 
ESGs have played a vital role in the war on terrorism by supporting Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) and Maritime Security Operations (MSO).  
Operation Unified Assistance – Indian Ocean Tsunami  
On December 6, 2004, the ESG-5 led by the USS Bonhomme Richard departed San Diego for the 
Arabian Gulf.  Twenty days later, a devastating Tsunami reeked disaster on the nation of Indonesia.  The 
seven ships carrying thousands of sailors and marines changed course while the PIHIBRON 7, 15th MEU, 
and ESG-5 commanders generated plans for the new mission, Operation Unified Assistance.  
The sailors and marines provided much needed manpower to clear roads, build temporary shelters, and set 
up water purification plants.  In addition, these numbers contained special skills that were of great value.  
The culinary staff baked sustenance items (e.g., high nutrient corn bread) and treats such as cookies and 
brownies for the children.  The dental staff set up a clinic at the hospital in Meulaboah, which saw 40 
patients in the first 3 days.  Additionally, the medical staff of the ESG stood ready to aid victims if 
needed, and welders provided assistance in the repair of a Singaporean ship, adding two more landing 
craft to the international team. 
In addition to the manpower and skills, the ESG-5 provided numerous physical assets and technology that 
were vital to the relief effort.  En route, the ships began making and storing 30,000 gallons of potable 
water a day for the victims to drink while their purification systems were being repaired or rebuilt.  Once 
in position, the Bonhomme Richard established a communication system to coordinate the efforts of the 
international reliefteam.  In addition, the 3 Air Cushioned Landing Craft (LCAC) were able to ferry the 
personnel, heavy equipment (including forklifts and tractors), food, water, medical supplies, and 
personnel to the coastal areas.  The 29 helicopters airlifted food, water, medical supplies, as well as 
military and NGO personnel to inland locations now unreachable by ground.  The helicopters also 
performed search and rescue operations.  In total, the LCACS and helicopters of the ESG-5 delivered 1.5 







After departing the Sea of China, the ships deployed to their original destination, the Arabian Gulf.  Once 
there, the marines departed the ships; this time to provide security during Iraq’s first election in decades.  
The naval assets safeguarded oil rigs and performed MIO that captured drugs that insurgents were 
planning to sell to finance their terrorist activities.  These activities continued until the ship returned to 
San Diego in early June 2005. 
All activities were planned and coordinated by the 15th MEU and PHIBRON 7 working in support of the 
CESG-5.  As noted, the activities on this deployment were diverse and emergent.  The commanders 
needed to be prepared for a new mission quickly.  This requires an organization that is flexible and 
adaptive. 
South-Asian Earthquake Relief 
ESG-1 departed San Diego on July 22, 2005 led by the USS Tarawa.  After participating in a civilian 
medical and dental assistance operation in the Philippines and a multinational exercise in Egypt, ESG-1 
moved towards its destination in the Arabian Gulf.  As with ESG-5, upon arrival in theater, the marines 
departed the ships for operations in Iraq.  Shortly thereafter, on October 8, an earthquake occurred in 
South Asia.  The Pakistani government requested assistance from the US government and, in partial 
response, Admiral Michael LeFever, CESG-1, was designated as the coordinator of the Combined 
Disaster Assistance Center (CDAC), Pakistan. 
In addition to the coordination of US assets, the CDAC had a major role in the integration of international 
military efforts, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other international organizations, and 
worked closely with representatives of the State Department, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team 
(DART), ODRP (Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan) and others.  Overall, these organizations 
were following the guidance and requests of the Pakistan government.  
Within two days, Admiral LeFever and key members of his staff were on the ground in Islamabad.  The 
quick installation of a FO/GO-led planning staff in response to this crisis demonstrates an important 
aspect of the adaptability of the ESG. 
The CDAC was to act in support of the Government of Pakistan (GOP), keeping as limited a footprint as 
possible, while providing a range of capabilities.  Some of the immediate capabilities were provided by 
ESG-1 platforms.  The USS Pearl Harbor arrived almost immediately to offload heavy machinery to be 
used in support of the relief effort.  Sailors worked in coordination with personnel from Naval Mobile 
Construction Battalions (NMCB, or “Seabees”) in using this machinery to clear debris and improve road 
access.  Other ESG-1 amphibious ships were also used to transport relief supplies coming from donor 
nations.  ESG-1 sailors worked side-by-side with military personnel from other countries to off- and on-
load relief supplies.  The ESG’s limited helicopter capability was quickly supplemented by a Helicopter 
Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) from NAVCENT.  
An excerpt from Commander’s Comments section of the situation report of CDAC(U) dated 12 
December 2005 illustrates both the daily activities and the cumulated total of services provided: 
“Another great day of weather in support of relief efforts: 212 MASH maintained their solid effort, 
treated 152 (6,409 total) patients, conducted 04 (313 total) surgeries, and maintained nine bed occupancy. 
CMRT-3 treated 148 (4,230) total patients, conducted 1 surgery (34 total)…TF Eagle had another solid 
flight day supporting the relief effort with six CH-47 and two S-70s providing 22 sorties, carrying 71.20 
tons of humanitarian assistance, 01 [casualty evacuations] and 71 [displaced Pakistanis]. Task Force 
Wright pumped 45,439 gallons (257,470 gallons total) for 15 (451 total) aircraft at Muzaffarabad and 
8,601 gallons (61,659 gallons total) for 16 (128 total) aircraft at Shinkiari. PBS News Hour revisited 212 







After four weeks, the ships of the ESG-1 were re-assigned to other operations in the region (see section 
below).  The initial request for assistance from CDAC was to be limited to 90 days, but with the degree of 
devastation and the isolation of many of those needing assistance with the onset of winter, this period was 
extended. 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Maritime Security Operations (MSO) 
While some assets of ESG-1 were supporting the disaster relief effort, other resources were used for MIO 
and MSO, as part of ESG-1’s regular mission set.  The MIO efforts seek to prevent terrorists from 
attempting to use the maritime environment as a venue for attack or as a medium to transport personnel, 
weapons or other illicit material.  The MSO mission in the northern Persian Gulf helps to protect the 
integrity of Iraqi territorial waters as well as defending Iraq’s oil terminals. 
As part of an MIO effort, ESG-1 released TACON of the USS Tarawa, the USS Cleveland, and – for a 
short time – the USS Gonzales to Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150) for a pulse operation in the North 
Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman that was led by a French Admiral and also included ships from several 
other countries.  The remaining assets of ESG-1 supported CTF150 in this mission, especially for 
information and intelligence gathering.  
Intelligence gathering for this MIO pulse effort was supplied by coalition maritime patrol aircraft, 
helicopters from the Tarawa and USS Oscar Austin, and the Scan Eagle UAV operated from the USS 
Cleveland.  The ESG retained OPCON and TACON of the Scan Eagle, thus requiring coordination 
among the PGC-N2, the CTF150-N2 and the ESG-1-N2 for both requests for information (RFI) and 
dissemination of UAV images.  Tasking of the Scan Eagle assets was done via the Current Operations 
(COPS) cell of the ESG-1. 
Of interest to our research program is the C2 relationships that were established during this mission.  The 
PHIBRON (CPR-1) wore multiple hats that reported to different higher authorities.  One of these hats was 
as the (supported) Pulse Group Commander (PGC), and was TACON to CTF150.  In addition, the 
PHIBRON retained his role of Sea Combat Commander (SCC) under ESG-1.  In all likelihood, this 
required a splitting of the CPR-1 staff. 
The MSO operations in the northern Persian Gulf (under CTF152) were supported by the USS Pearl 
Harbor and USS Chosin.  The Chosin had a major role as Air Defense Commander (ADC) for the MSO 
operation; but as the remaining ESG-1 ships were in a different geographical region than was the Chosin, 
it was necessary to activate the alternate ADC on the Tarawa.  For a time, the Gonzalez and the frigate 
USS Ingraham were assigned to support CTF150 in conducting maritime operations.  These ships were 
subsequently involved in other missions within theater.  Noteworthy to the experience of this ESG-1 was 
clearly the distribution of its forces across missions and areas.  As quoted by CAPT David Clopp, the 
operations officer (N3) for ESG-1, “We’re in four different places, doing four different missions at the 
same time.  It definitely shows the agility of the ESG.  We are able to conduct multiple missions at once.” 
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